could transfer funds as a counterpart to their shipping of commodities, capital was bound to be available at a cost that did not diverge much, on average, across markets that traded with one another. This in turn facilitated the extension of the trading system especially in places and for commodities that caused minimum disruption in the rest of the economy, since this limited the regulatory backlash by temporal and religious authorities. Therefore, the contours of the bell jar coincided with the boundaries of world shipping, and the development of capitalism was confined to the realm of global commerce, "unable to conquer the whole society".
Another contribution of this paper is to construct new series of commercial interest rates in Amsterdam, London, and Paris. Systematic evidence on these is not available from contemporary sources. This absence is in large part attributable to regulations that set caps on interest rates and deterred contemporaries from giving too much publicity to the business of lending. Here measure the opportunity cost of lending by recovering the interest-rate component of foreign exchange quotations.
Finally, the new statistical material presented here shows that, although interest-rate levels were quite similar across markets, suggesting sheer integration, cyclical properties varied considerably, with more volatility in certain markets than in others (for instance, movements in Paris appear to have been dominated by seasonal variations). This means that the precise operation of the different credit markets located inside the global system is significant in its own right and calls for more research on markets microstructures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section discusses contemporary views on how much interest rates differed across countries and why. The second section focuses on prime commercial lending and explains why clean series for interest rates are rare in primary sources. The third section develops a simple model of the bell jar and builds on it an arbitrage formula to retrieve "shadow" interest rates from exchange rate quotations. The fourth section discusses our findings in relation to national and international monetary architecture. The fifth section compares our results with other domestic interest-rate series, yield on government debt, and private returns on land. The last section offers conclusions and directions for future research.
Why Do Interest Rates Differ?

Child, Interest Rates, and Prosperity
While it is hard to find consistent interest rate series, P.G.M. Dickson (1967) reckons that economists, policy makers and merchants of the seventeen and eighteenth centuries were actually obsessed with international interest-rate comparison. Edward Hatton writes that "the rate of interest is the sum given for the use of 100 l. for one year, and it is in some places more, in others less" (1699, p. 137) , and the reasons why they were in some places more and in others less intrigued observers. This is because they perceived that deviations in the price of money bore some relation to respective national economic performances. Prosperity (or, in the language of the time, "riches") was found where interest rates were lowest. Amsterdam was the archetype of cheap money and sheer wealth occurring jointly. He who mastered the mystery of capital would also achieve economic prowess.
Thus causality was found to run from cheap money to prosperity: in the language of the first proponent of this view, Josiah Child, low interest rates were the "causa causans [the causing cause] of all other riches of [the Dutch]" (Child 1668) . "The abatement of the interest", Child claimed, "is the cause of the prosperity and riches of any nation", and to drive home his point Child's statement was typed in upper case letters. The capital market, he concluded, was the philosopher's stone of development.
Gathering empirical evidence, he further argued that his law of an inverse relation between the level of interest rates and riches did never "fail in any particular instance": In France, where the rates were at 7%, the "Gentry lives in good conditions" but "Peazants are little better than slaves". In Italy, where rates stood at 3%, "people are rich, full of trade [and] well attired". The result held in Christendom but also "under the Turk Dominions, East-India, and America" (Child 1668 ).
Child's approach anticipated the work of Douglass North and Barry Weingast celebrated paper on the relation between Britain's development and its "Financial Revolution" in the late seventeenth century. 4 Child's way of looking at economic progress became a genre in the period that followed. The anonymous author of a pamphlet against high interest rates, writing probably in 1695, argued that, "as it is evident in those Countries viz. in Holland and Italy where Money is at 3%, trade flourishes, but in Spain, and other places where the interest of Money is at 10 and 12%, the people are poor, and have but little trade". 5 One French economist of the mid-eighteenth century mentions that 4 North and Weingast, "Constitutions," argue that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 caused a profound reorganization of the institutional design of Britain's government, evidence of which is available in the sharp improvement of borrowing terms after 1688. 5 An Answer to a paper entitled Reasons against reducing interest to four percent, in Miscellaneous papers on banking, London (1695 London ( -1750 . British Library (8223e7).
it is "a widespread opinion nowadays that the interest on money has an influence on agriculture and commerce". 6 Using the numerous books that compared "national" interest rates, we constructed
Figure 1 (Table A .1 in the Appendix gives background data and sources). The chart captures the well-known downward trend in interest rates already emphasized by Carlo Maria Cipolla (1952) . Gregory Clark (2005) argues that "the magnitude of this decline [of interest rates] is little appreciated, its cause is a mystery, and its connection to the shift to an economic system with persistent advance is unknown" (2005, p.1). Contemporaries for their part were mostly intrigued by the cross sectional properties of the data. They found that Holland and --perhaps more surprisingly, in view of recent literature on the topic --Italy, were rich countries with low interest rates. 7 Other European nations, such as Britain and France, were found within an interval of about 200 basis points above the two leaders. Britain's spread relative to Holland and Italy declines gradually. On the other hand, non-European countries had much higher rates: China, Turkey, and even such areas of European settlement as the West Indies and the British colonies of North America.
6 Buchet, Causes de la diversité, p. 3 "C'est une opinion aujourd'hui généralement reçue, que l'intérêt de l'Argent a une influence sur l'Agriculture et sur le Commerce. Cette opinion admise, il serait superflu d'examiner s'il est important de connaître les causes qui en déterminent le Taux; l'utilité de cette recherche est évidente". 7 On Italy's financial lead, see Fratianni and Spinelli, "Did Genoa ?".
Constitutions, Commitments and Credit
We have suggested that there is a similarity between contemporary views on the relations between capital markets and development and the ideas developed more recently by North and Weingast (1989 Of course, the argument came in various packages. One emphasized the rule of law.
Because governments had a responsibility to promote a sound judicial system, the quality of government institutions reverberated on the condition of private credit (an anticipation of LaPorta et al. 1997 LaPorta et al. , 1998 
Challenges of Direct Evidence
The parallel between contemporary views on credit and modern theories, which the previous section established, is as striking as it is intriguing: seventeenth and eighteenth century economists perceived and analyzed their world in pretty much the same way as today's influential economic historians. On the one hand, this may tell us about the sophistication of contemporary understanding; on the other hand, it may suggest the incompleteness of our current beliefs. Should we trust eighteenth century observers? As
Braudel would probably have argued, contemporaries perceive only imperfectly the world in which they live, and we cannot rule out that we too are erring on the wrong side.
Searching for the risk-free rate
The evidence on which contemporaries based their assessment is not airtight. The interest rates reported by Child and included in Figure 1 (Condillac 1776, pp. 147-48 ).
Condillac argued that such an interest rate must have reflected the market power of the lender and thus is certainly not informative of the "genuine" cost of capital, which he suggested be found in leading commercial centers. The same would hold of the interest rate at which, say, today's sellers of Biri leaves (a kind of tobacco) in Kolkata's streets secure their capital. There again, the "interest rate" would fail to convey any information on "Indian" interest rates.
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The matter is further complicated by the existence of usury regulations. The numbers by Hatton (1699 Hatton ( , 1716 and included in Essay, . Similarly, Temple, Observations, dwelled on the differences between "country risk" and "sovereign risk", referred to as "private" and "publick safety". 17 Indeed, Hatton, Merchant's Magazine, gave 6% as the interest rate in Britain, this was the usury rate prevailing at the time. This number is revised to 5% in the next edition (1716), following the 1714 abatement of the usury ceiling to 5%. 18 Luckett, Crédit: "There probably never was a time in European history when usury laws actually prevented lenders from charging interest, but it should be clear from the foregoing that the formal compliance with these laws shaped the form and function of credit instruments by forcing business people to disguise interest payments as something else … . Short term credit at interest was disguised as credit without interest by the simple trick of including the interest payment with the principal. Peter purchases own conclusion was that "little dependence for information, then, can be placed on that which is the fixed and legal rate of interest, when we find it may differ so considerably from the market rate" (1821, chap. XXI).
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Benchmarks
We think the best way to measure the opportunity cost of capital (the "benchmark" interest rate) during the period under study is to look at short-term commercial rates: the rates at which credit was extended to a merchant banker of high standing by his correspondents in other cities.
This benchmark is analytically distinct from, though not necessarily inconsistent with, the approach by Clark (1996) , who calculates private interest rates in Great Britain using the return on land and on rent charges. It is, however, in contrast with the emphasis on sovereign bond prices in North and Weingast (1989) One further reason for using merchant bankers' interest rates is their long noted ability to escape usury regulations altogether. According to Raymond de Roover (1953) , bills of exchange (i.e., promises to pay a certain amount in a given place at a later date) were the from Paul, on credit, a quantity of merchandise priced at 100£, for which he writes out a promise to pay Paul in six months the amount of 102£ 10s. Who is to say that the latter figure was not actually the cash price? Certainly the note itself contains no indication that interest has been charged". 19 As Ricardo went on: "Adam Smith informs us, that from the 37th of Henry VIII to 21st of James I, 10 per cent continued to be the legal rate of interest. Soon after the Restoration, it was reduced to 6 per cent, and by the 12th of Anne, to 5 per cent. He thinks the legal rate followed, and did not precede the market rate of interest. Before the American war, Government borrowed at 3 per cent., and the people of credit in the capital, and in many other parts of the kingdom at 3 1/2, 4 and 4 1/2 per cent", Principles, chap. XXI. 20 We return to this point in the last section of the paper. 21 His conclusion was that "we need only subtract from the Rates paid by other People the Rates paid by the Gentleman, Merchant, or Tradesman, and the remainder will be Praemia of Risque" (p. 21). 22 "Parce que l'argent dans les places de commerce a un prix courant, comme le bled en a un dans les marchés. On traite publiquement, ou du moins on ne se cache point ; et on vend son argent comme on vendroit toute autre marchandise" (Condillac, Commerce, p. 148) .
instruments of choice whereby promoters of the commercial revolution managed to escape usury ceilings. Unlike other financial instruments, such as France's billets à ordre, which had a local circulation and thus subject to regulation, bills of exchange incorporated a convenient spatial dimension. 23 The price they charged on bills of exchange, the bankers emphasized, was motivated by the risks and efforts associated with overcoming the obstacles of foreign settlement. 24 Consequently, foreign exchange bills were an ideal place to hide a loan, and the exchange rate an ideal place to hide an interest rate.
The problem may be stated as follows. Suppose that legislation prevents interest rates from rising above a certain ceiling, which would constitute "usury". This obviously puts a severe constraint on the growth of formal credit markets: instead of charging higher interest rates when market conditions deteriorate, agents face a choice of either cheating or rationing. 25 However, suppose that bankers are entitled to buy and sell bills of exchange payable in foreign centers, and assume again that there is a sudden need to push interest rate above the usury ceiling. In this case, whereas domestic bankers cannot legally lend at the new interest rate, foreign bankers can buy bills on that center at a low price, in effect incorporating the unlawful interest rate. If one has a correspondent in each market, one can then arrange swaps that formally are exchange operations but really are credit operations. For legislators, it is hard to argue that bill prices in foreign centers are low because local interest rates are high, since lending does not exist in the first place or, if it does exist formally, it exists at a price that meets regulations. Moreover, as emphasized by Eric Kerridge, even Church regulators had always been kinder with inter merchant credit, in which they saw agreements between consenting adults. 26 But the fact remains that a low price for bills is the same as a high interest rate (see John Munro 2001 for a recent statement).
23 On "billets à ordre", see e.g. Fuleman, Traité, Formal legislation incorporated this principle, which was kept in force all over Europe until the early nineteenth century. De Roover, L'évolution, p. 45, gives Napoléon's Code de Commerce as a late example. 25 The point was first made by Montesquieu's Lettres Persanes. His critique was formally directed against Muslim's sharia but was really targeted the Christian religion. Adam Smith discusses this point in the passage referred to earlier, and where he likens interest prohibition to a failure of the rule of law: "When the law prohibits interest altogether, it does not prevent it. Many people must borrow, and nobody will lend without such a consideration for the use of their money as is suitable, not only to what can be made by the use of it, to the difficulty and danger of evading the law. The high rate of interest among all Mahometan nations is accounted for by Mr. Montesquieu; not from their poverty, but partly from this, and partly from the difficulty of recovering the money", Smith, Inquiry, book I, chapter IX, page 133. 26 . Kerridge, Usury, passim.
A statement of this mechanism is provided in an early discussion by Gerard de Malynes (1601). In effect, Malynes (a Huguenot) saw global finance as a social "canker", or cancer, given its ability to circumvent legislations. As he explained, there are regulations on interest rates but not on exchange rates, so that a foreign investment (the purchase of a foreign bill) can produce a bigger interest rate than domestic credit, which
British regulations of the time limited to 10%:
The difference betwixt those that deliver their money at interest or by exchange, in regard of usurie, consisteth onely in the name, for they have both an intention of gaine upon money, and do beare an adventure for the losse of their monies, where as the one is certaine to have no more but ten upon the hundredth at the most, and the other doth expect at least 15. or 20. upon the hundredth, in regard whereof he is contended to stand in adventure to lose sometimes (and that seldome) by exchanges, but still the intention remaineth, which should be the surest guide of conscience to take away false or counterfeit pretences.
By the end of the eighteenth century, financial innovation had reached such a level of perfection that bankers could rely on a vast array of credit instruments based on derivatives of bills of exchange. These are described in the various editions of the Negociator's magazine, a leading financial textbook of the time (Hayes 1777) . After a concise presentation of plain vanilla bills of exchange (called "real exchange"), the book gets into a long list of hot ways to use "dry exchange" meant to circumvent regulations and thus perform "usury" --that is, lend locally rather than internationally to yield a return that did not consider usury constraints.
These operations were typically over-the-counter transactions between consenting adults who were "feigning an exchange" (de Roover 1944). For instance, a banker in city A agreed to buy a first foreign bill payable in city B and use the proceeds to purchase at the maturity of that bill a second "return" bill payable in city A, thereby creating what was essentially a local loan. Hayes indicates that such an operation could be either covered or uncovered depending on whether bankers had agreed in advance on the price of the return bill.
27 If the operation was covered then it was bound by arbitrage to yield the same return as a local loan, had such a contract existed. If finance theory is a guide, the price of bills of exchange must have incorporated an implicit interest rate equal to the interest rate that 27 He states: "In dry exchange, sometimes the Sum to be repaid for the Sum received is fixed, determined, or certain, and sometimes uncertain or accidental", Negociator Magazine, p. 3.
would have been charged every time this could be done in the open, as was the case when interest rates were low or toward the late eighteenth century, as tolerance for credit became increasingly.
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In summary, exchange bills were "off shore" financial instruments that could be combined in many creative ways to replicate missing instruments. This was well recognized by the economists of the time such as Condillac, who argued that "legislators condemn lending on interest, and they allow it. … For, they do not object to exchange bills and they do object to lending on interest. … Are lending and borrowing anything else than an exchange transaction?". 29 Condillac's assessment resounds as the late eighteenth century's pragmatic answer to Malynes's earlier moral concerns. Through the agency of bills of exchange, credit had become a fact of life.
The Case of the Missing Commercial Rate
We therefore set out to collect data on the interest rate at which merchant bankers involved in long-distance trade would borrow or lend money. This is more easily said than done. Direct evidence on commercial interest rates is exceedingly difficult to come by. Whichever financial center we are looking at, there are no recorded series of "money market" rates for the period before the French Revolution. Rather such series generally start around the second half of the nineteenth century. This seems to conflict with the earlier indication that contemporaries knew what they were talking about when they mentioned "national interest rates" but it is consistent with the fact that we are dealing with an over-the-counter market. In order for "one" price to be recorded and quoted, a formal centralized market must be organized. This requirement was not met by the credit markets of the time, since interest rates resulted from bilateral drawing arrangements that were in turn put to work as a lever for operating on the foreign exchange market.
Formalization and centralization prevailed in the foreign exchange market, not in the money market. As a result, a precise notion of the "general interest rate", meaning probably the typical conditions that the best houses in a center would extend to their correspondent in another center, must have existed as a kind of "mental average" in the mind of contemporary practitioners but was nowhere to be quoted. But the "local" interest rate that a banker would extend to its correspondent could not really be made public, since These considerations shed light on the significance of the alternative sources that are nonetheless available. One is the interest rates at which banks of issue would discount bills when they did. Since these banks had commercial activities, such rates must have been related to the price at which other institutions engaged in lending activity. On the other hand, banks of issue were typically not merchant banks and hence were subject to public scrutiny. As a result, the indications they provide are a bit off the mark and probably not much better than legal rates. Another possible source is occasional reports in contemporary commercial letters, reflecting what observers felt was "the" relevant rate at a given time in a given commercial community (i.e., financial center). Provided such reports come from relevant persons (i.e. genuine operators) they must be trustworthy. This encourages using archives in order to be as close as possible to where the business of merchant banking was taking place, as opposed to relying on a patchwork of comments in the secondary literature. Ideally, one would want to find systematic information on bilateral drawing conventions between correspondents, since they would state the interest rate at which business would be conducted even as the private nature of these documents helped them eschew legislation. However, archives are not a magic bullet. Sheer luck is involved, and the cost of collecting information can become prohibitive. Beyond the problem of the significance of the material they contain, we want to make sure that we focus on really top signatures, i.e. "risk free", not on "average" merchant, or industrialist of good standing. 31 The intersection of these constraints with the small number of available material may be zero.
Thus, interest-rate collectors have tended to be eclectic in their choice of sources, as illustrated by Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla's pioneering work. 32 These authors provide some numbers for the markets on which this paper focuses. For Amsterdam, they 30 Reflecting on this paradox, Lüthy, Banque protestante, p. 435 wondered how contemporary authors could be so sure when they mentioned, say, that discount rates "stood in France at 6%" when "the actual business of local discounting had not come to age" ("D'après les auteurs économistes du temps -mais où prennent-ils cette assurance puisque l'escompte des lettres de change n'est pas encore entré dans les usages?-le taux d'escompte courant en France est de 6%"). The permanent stimulus to foreign investment was the low rate of interest in Holland. In the seventeenth century it had fallen from 6 1/2 to 3 1/2 and in the eighteenth century it was 3 to 2 1/2 per cent". Wilson, "Economic Decliner," p. 122. We referred to Van Dillen, Bronnen, which does not contain more information but does use to original sources: rates for "commercial loans" that the Bank of Amsterdam made to some private merchants. 36 Note, however, that "usury" (i.e., the maximum legal interest rate) was at 5% after 1714 and that the Bank of England rate was at 4% during most of the century. 37 "En réalité, c'est entre 4 et 5% qu'il faut évaluer le taux de l'intérêt au XVIIIème siècle … L'escompte ne dépassait pas 6%" Saugrain, Baisse, p. 107.
"norm" in Lyons, though "scarcity" may have caused interest rates to rise as high as 9%. According to this source, the interest rate for bills of exchange remained at 6% from 1746 (when the Affiches started being published) to April 1749, was then reported at 5% until September 1758, and then returned to 6%. Luckett expresses reservations about these quotations, which fail to display the "kind of volatility one would expect from a financial market", and concludes that the rates reported may have represented a "kind of norm"
(1992, p.31). In any case, the series lapses in 1759, and we can only speculate on the reasons for this.
Shadow Interest Rates
The Bell Jar: A Model
Consider the following thought experiment. The world is made of n trading centers. As in Condillac (1776) , there are strict controls on domestic credit but no controls on capital movements. Merchant bankers can buy and sell foreign exchange bills, which are promises to pay a certain amount of money in a certain foreign trading center at a certain time, say two months in the future. 42 By "secured" we refer to bills of exchange that were the counterpart of a commercial transaction; "unsecured" bills were not. The Affiches also gave interest rates and promissory notes (billets à ordre), but in view of our discussion the bills of exchange are to be preferred.
market for domestic credit so that, there is no such thing as a "local" interest rate (an interest rate at which local bankers would lend money to one another). Suppose as well that there are no transaction costs and that all markets use the same currency, so that there is no exchange risk. This convenient assumption will be amended at a later stage. Now, we let merchant bankers trade their bills of exchange all over the world. They lend to one another. In equilibrium, this determines a uniform "world" interest rate, say r. This is because if the rate at which bankers agree to swap their positions differs from unity, then arbitrage is feasible. This also determines the price at which foreign exchange bills trade in each market. Let's call this price the "exchange rate", or a ij . It is the price bankers in market i are prepared to pay in order to purchase one unit of "universal" currency to be paid in market j within two months. If the world interest rate r is expressed in percentage per annum and the maturity of the bill is two-month (one sixth of a year)
This shows that merchants need not quote the interest rate r but only the exchange rate.
The crucial point to understand is that, despite the lack of a domestic money market, there does exist a global capital market and a global interest rate, thanks to the availability of a global foreign exchange market with time contracts. This global interest rate, however, is a "shadow" interest rate in that it is not recorded in any periodical or price current. It exists only implicitly in the price at which bankers are prepared to trade domestic balances against foreign time deposits. This world displays a peculiar form of financial development; an efficient global market for credit will thrive, despite the lack of domestic markets.
Obviously, if there were local markets for credit, these markets would have to clear at the same price as implied by equilibrium in the global money market (as will be discussed later), so that local interest rates should be identical to global ones. But the point is that such local markets need not exist. Consequently, the existence of local markets is not a precondition for the development of a global money market. Even in the absence of welldeveloped local markets, a global market can strive. This is the essence of the bell jar.
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Globalization may precede national development. 43 . In fact, our model captures the notion that financial development is a process that proceeded "topdown" --that is, from the making of a global market to the emergence of local ones. The Commercial Revolution, by creating a network of correspondent bankers working along trade relations, fostered the development of a global credit market that could prosper quite apart from the rest of the economy and that Two slight complications are now introduced to make our framework more realistic.
First, exchange rates can vary. Merchant bankers buying bills denominated in specific currencies must to adjust the world interest rate according to their expectations of future exchange rate changes. The result is n potentially different local interest rates whose prices incorporate compensation for expected appreciation or depreciation with respect to the virtual global currency standard. Depreciating currencies will have higher interest rates, appreciating currencies lower ones. Second, there are transaction costs. These entail a lower price (higher interest rates) for bills of exchange that are payable in trading centers characterized by greater frictions. In practice, since transaction costs are likely to be determined by bilateral characteristics (such as the greater or smaller number of correspondents that trading center i has in market j), there are n-1 different local shadow interest rates for each individual centre. Obviously, arbitrage ensures that the n-1 shadow interest rates for market j differ little from one another, since, with zero transaction costs they should be all identical. But the point is that the modern notion of a national interest rate just doesn't exist as such. In this economy, we have only "bilateral" interest rates, i.e. interest rates in city j as seen from i.
Our empirical approach builds on this insight. Specifically, we consider the following arbitrage, which is a generalization of (1). There are two bills of exchange of different maturities traded in a given market (i) and payable in a certain foreign centre (j). Denoting by a ij the number of units of currency i that bankers give to get one unit of currency j in country j in n months and x ij the number of units of currency i that bankers give to obtain one unit of currency j in country j on the spot, we have r j i as the shadow interest rate in center j "according" to centre i:
To be precise, r j i is the marginal interest rate in center j as given by center i.
"Marginal" means the following: Suppose that in market i, where bills on j are being traded, there is a number of bankers who have various drawing arrangements with their correspondents in market j. Banker A can lend and borrow from his correspondent at 4%, Banker B at 5%, Banker C at 5.5%, and so forth. Suppose now that the exchange rate on must therefore have preceded local development, explaining why local interest rates are hard to come by: the only thing that existed was the global concept of the opportunity cost of lending real resources.
two-month bills payable in j falls to a price such that the shadow interest rate in j is 4.5%.
Banker A will find it profitable to buy such bills and transfer the funds to center j, thus raising the price of bills on j up to the level where arbitrage is no longer feasible; hence the implicit interest rate on j, according to prices in i, will return to 4%. Consequently, the shadow interest rate reveals the opportunity cost of a draft on j by the most competitive merchant banker in center i.
In practice, of course, things must have been dramatically more complex. When one drew a bill on a foreign center, one could never be entirely sure of the conditions there.
The correspondent might have changed terms or even gone bust. There was thus an inevitable element of chance. Therefore, the series we are about to uncover reflect a given market's perceptions of the conditions in another foreign market at a given time. This is certainly not the same thing as knowing the actual interest rate in that center, if such an interest rate existed at all. But we must emphasize that in the eighteenth century, that's all there was.
Methodology
In the literature, arbitrage relations between exchange rates and interest rates have been used in two main ways. Some studies have sought to derive the missing term of the equation: to compute implicit interest rates from knowledge of the price of spot and time exchange bills as just explained or, more often, to compute a spot exchange-rate series from knowledge of the price of time bills and interest rates. Such computations actually mimic actual computations by merchant bankers. Foreign exchange quotations recorded the price of "notional" contracts, typically a one, two or three-month bill payable in a given foreign place. 44 However, comparisons required putting all exchange rates on the same time footing --that is, transforming the various time quotations to a common maturity. 45 The implication must be that contemporary market operators used some (possibly conventional) interest rate, even when these did not exist in the open. 44 Reference to future payments has misled a number of authors, who have referred to these quotations as "forward exchange rates". For instance, Juhl, Wiles, and Weidenmier, "Covered Interest Arbitrage," argue that they introduce a "new weekly database for spot and forward US-UK exchange rates". However, these authors really refer to time bills of exchange. This is inadequate because a forward exchange contract implies no current down payment whereas quotations for time bills of exchange recorded outright purchases, implying full payment. Obstfeld and Taylor, "Globalization," refer to the exercises they perform with time bills as "Covered Interest Parity [CIP] tests" (a language that is also used by Juhl et al., "Covered Interest arbitrage". Since CIP is a condition on the pricing of forward markets, these authors must think of time bills as genuine forward instruments. For details on the emergence of forward exchange markets in the nineteenth century, see Flandreau and Komlos, "Target Zones." 45 An illustration of this is found in William Tate's discussion of "arbitrations of exchanges", where he explains how, given an interest rate, "sight" rates can be computed from knowledge of the price of time bill. 
Another group of studies has been concerned with matters of market integration.
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Efficiency requires that local interest rates and shadow interest rates, when they both exist, be identical to one another. Formally, these studies have considered the spread between actual and implicit interest rates. Under efficiency, this spread should be zero:
Tate, Modern Cambist, pp. 89-90; The two places of operation should be taken at a long date as 3 months, and then discounted … according to the rate charged by the two houses of business …. To show how to apply this discount properly, we will take the rates at the following example …: London on Paris at 3 months is quoted Fr. 25 55 Cents Paris on London at 3 months -Fr. 25 10 Cents The discount for 3 months is there stated to be taken at 1 per Cent or 25 Cents (the interest is here reckoned at 4 per Cent per Annum), which is taken from the London rate, and added to the Paris rate to make them Short or Cash rates; rendering the one Frs. 25 30 Cents and the others Frs. 25 35 Cents. The interest is taken from the London rate, because if I send the Bill to Paris, and get it discounted there, the Interest will be deducted; but it is added to the Paris rate, because, if at Paris I want a bill upon London at sight, I shall have more French money to pay for it, than I should have to Pay for a Bill at three months.see also Tate, Foreign Exchanges. 46 They continue in a footnote: "Trotter was, in fact, granting credit to Americans, and thus the bill prices reflect an interest payment. Moreover, since credit was being granted in the American market, the discount on the bills was the American rate. This is true regardless of what Trotter's British correspondents did with the remitted bills -whether they were held until the British importer paid them at maturity, or had them discounted in Britain", "Dollar Sterling Exchange," p. 53, emphasis added. 
A Walk through the 18 th Century
In the rest of the paper, we apply the methodology detailed previously and compute implicit (or, in the language of the time, "arbitrated") interest rates from the exchange rates of the schelling vlaamsch Banco of Amsterdam, the British pound sterling, and the Schenk 1998) . In other words, what we are really computing is, in a world of credit controls, the interest rate on "Euro-écus" and "Euro-schellings" in London as well as the interest rate on "Euro-pounds" in Amsterdam. The euro-currency metaphor squares nicely with the notion of our "shadow" interest rates being the price that would clear the supply and demand of credit in a cosmopolitan "Republic of Merchants". Alliance. This may explain the discontinuation of double quotation in Amsterdam on several other centers (except for quotations on London, which suffered a break around 1690). Another interesting feature of the primary source is that it is also about that time that we observe a shift, for short maturities, from "usance" to "sight".
to leave it aside at this stage, although we return to it later on. Entries for alternative maturities on London are always identified. Sight is identified as "op zigt", long bills as "op uso van 2 M. Dato". As before, we focused on the best exchange rate.
Previous research about the topic considers sight as spot and derives the implicit interest rate by straight application of formula (2). 60 However, it should be noted that sight is not spot because there is a time delay between the purchase of a "sight" bill and when it is cashed, since there is the physical delay involved with such things as the time needed for reaching Dover and crossing the Channel, as one late eighteenth century banker does in the opening pages of Charles Dickens's Tale of Two Cities. Similarly, for long bills, one must reckon with the grace period between the day the bill is presented and the day it is paid. Thus, the long exchange rate a ij [n l ] and the short exchange rate a ij [n s ], can be rewritten in terms of an imaginary spot exchange rate x ij as
Substituting for x ij gives the arbitrage condition that we have used to derive shadow interest rates (details for sources are shown in Table 2): 61
Individual Interest-Rate Series
Figures 2-4 depict the results from implementing equation (8) on the data described previously. Figure 2 presents the shadow interest rate for London as per Amsterdam; Figure 3 , the shadow interest rate for Amsterdam as per London; and Figure 4 , the shadow interest rate for Paris as per London. We have also reported on the charts (whenever this was feasible and meaningful) evidence on the short-term "commercial" interest rates discussed in Section II. Moreover, we also provide overlapping bars representing the financial crises summarized in Table 3 . To work out this table we relied on Charles P. Kindleberger (1989) , Neal (1990) , Luckett (1992 Luckett ( , 1996 , and the sources 60 See Eagly and Smith, "Domestic and International Integration," p. 201, and Schubert, "Arbitrage," p. 4, for eighteenth century data, though these papers do not show the interest-rate graphs and/or data. See also First, our estimates of the shadow interest rate in the three financial centers are quite obviously in line with direct evidence. This suggests that a more intensive search for interest rates in primary sources could lead further insights, especially for those centers that did not benefit from double quotation abroad so that a shadow interest rate cannot be
retrieved. An implication of this is that commercial credit was sufficiently developed and efficient for there was to be little difference between the average interest rate (as indicated by contemporaries) and marginal ones (as measured by the shadow interest rate). This is supporting evidence of a central claim in this paper.
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62 We have relied on the sources indicated by Luckett, Credit and "Crises" rather than on Luckett's own chronology of financial crises. The reason is that Luckett provides a chronology of financial crises that is suggested by the evidence of spikes in the arbitrated interest rate series he computes. Consequently, it would have been tautological to invoke his chronology as evidence in favor of our interest-rate data. 63 Incidentally, note the strong similarity between the implicit interest rate we compute for Paris during the mid-eighteenth century and the one reported in the Petites affiches. Luckett discards the evidence in Petites affiches on the grounds that the rates do not move much where financial series should fluctuate a lot. The rate reported in Petites affiches might not have moved much, but neither does our Paris shadow interest rate.
A second finding is the consistency between the behavior of implicit interest rates and independent evidence on crisis, suggesting here again that our computations are very informative. As already emphasized by Luckett (1992) , monetary crises were accompanied by high interest rates and this is exactly what we find. Moreover, although many crises were idiosyncratic, we note that some had an impact on several interest rates at once, a finding that accords with our hypothesis of a European-wide but closely knit, fabric of merchant bankers shifting capital from one centre to another. This is especially clear for Amsterdam and London, which exhibit co-movements in periods of stress. We now take a look at the long-run behavior of the three commercial interest-rate series thus computed. This is done in Figure 5 , which depicts 5-year moving averages.
Differentials between series remain small throughout, especially for the AmsterdamLondon pair. Paris interest rates were slightly higher --say, between 4% and 5% when London and Amsterdam were between 3% and 4.5% --but the salient fact is that differences across countries are not large and actually disappear toward the end of the century. Note also that the ranking emphasized by contemporary authors and summarized in Figure 1 (whereby Amsterdam rates were lowest, followed by British and French rates in that order) is modified. London catches up very early on and leads the pack thereafter.
It is hard to tell whether this is due to a measure of persistence in sources, which would have kept referring to an ordering that prevailed the late 17 th , early 18 th century. In any case discrepancies are dwarfed by common secular trends: specifically, a general tendency for the price of money to rise over time. This finding is interesting in view of many previous historical accounts, which have focused on individual countries and have therefore portrayed these evolutions as essentially idiosyncratic. An illustration of this is the work of Luckett (1992) and Phil Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and JeanLaurent Rosenthal (2000) , who have emphasized "French" factors to account for rising interest rates in Paris before the French Revolution. Although making sense of these common trends is still a long shot (an obvious candidate explanation is the mounting international political tensions that followed the U.S. independence), the evidence reported here suggests that we should be dealing with late eighteenth century monetary tensions as European-wide phenomena. 64 An implication would be that the financial 64 A rare exception emphasizing the international character of tensions in international credit markets of the 1780s is Bouchary, Marché. distress that preceded the Revolution might have more to do with European trends than with French ones -a fascinating extrapolation, given current views. 
Cycles and Seasonality
The data also exhibit cyclical patterns. A glimpse at This is also true of London rates. Amsterdam rates, by contrast, appear to have been less influenced by seasonality. Of all three economies, the French one was probably the most reliant on agriculture. We thus cannot rule out that money markets were influenced by crops and thus bore at least some connection with the state of the economy. Other economic factors may have contributed to cyclical behavior. Carrière et al. (1976, p. 87) report substantial effects of the arrival of Spanish galleons in Cadiz in late winter on European exchange rates. To the extent that the arrival of fleets exhibited seasonality, they might have contributed to the cyclical behavior of interest rates. Changes in the patterns of arrival of bullion might also have triggered changes in the patterns of seasonality. An intriguing feature of the data, however, is that this pattern disappears toward the latter part of the century. After 1770 we find essentially no seasonality for both Paris and London, with Amsterdam becoming by contrast more cyclical. This takes place precisely when the integration of money markets --as measured by average shadow interest rates --was highest. One explanation could be that certain markets managed to use other markets as lenders of last resort, thus transmitting to them their business cycle.
Bilateral Connections and the Structure of the Global Money Market
To conclude this section we take a look at the association between shadow interest rates in one financial center as measured from two other financial centers. Given our sources, this can only be done for Paris, since this is the only market for which both the In any event, the result from our exercise is depicted on Figure 8 , which reveals little connection between the two series. Since the Paris shadow interest rate, as priced in London, is consistent with direct evidence on reported average Paris conditions and is also obviously derived from quotation of a liquid instrument, it must be that the "abnormal" series is that constructed from the Amsterdam course of exchange. Subject to the foregoing qualification, this suggests that, within a general tendency toward market integration, a distinct hierarchy was nonetheless observed, with the more popular financial routes being those that were the most liquid, efficient, and thus informative.
65 See Condillac, Commerce. Condillac, obviously briefed by a banker of the time, goes into minute details while explaining how the resources of modern finance enabled bankers in France to take advantage of lower interest rates in Amsterdam when there was a profit to do so. That Paris rate were, on average, higher than Amsterdam ones suggests that the opposite must have been less frequent. were to go by the current rate in Paris then they should be entitled to charge "9%, 10%, or even 12%".
The episode raises many theoretical questions. First, the form of the drawing convention between the two firms should be explained. the slope of the yield curve since we are comparing short and long term debt, but this cannot be the entire story. At the very least, this casts doubts on the costs-of-transfer risks and institutional moral hazard in the Ancien Régime economy. We conclude that in France, the benchmark interest rate was provided by corporate credit (just as Condillac argued). By the same token, improvement in the government's credibility cannot in itself radically change the prospects for development. To capture this notion, we might describe the financial system of the eighteenth century as displaying a "corporate ceiling" rather than the "sovereign ceiling" that obtains today.
Another interesting comparison is with the returns on land. Given that we are now comparing two forms of private credit (commercial credit and land credit), one should expect consistency within both countries. Merchant bankers did invest part of their gains in land and real estate, so that returns on property should converge to returns from commercial investments. Such is indeed what we observe, and in a particularly striking manner for France. This is again consistent with our notion of a corporate ceiling. In conclusion, we suggest that the views developed in this paper have the potential to explain the long-run decline of interest rates in the late medieval and early modern periods, although verifying this should be the topic of future research. To the extent that merchant bankers connected with one another across Europe and achieved significant financial progress throughout the period, managing to reduce transaction and information costs by a variety of technological improvements, one should expect a decline in the return they required from extending commercial credit. By the same token, one should observe a reflection of this decline in the equilibrium return of all other assets in which these bankers invested. It may therefore be that the financial progress brought about by the Commercial Revolution goes a long way toward explaining the puzzle of declining land return identified by Clark (1996) . Those sectors that were fortunate to attract the attention of merchants thus became an inclusive part of the bell jar. The rest were locked out.
Conclusions
Owing to the fragmentary nature of the data, the evidence in this paper must remain incomplete. But a number of truly important findings emerge. The first is a fairly radical hypothesis: We have pleaded here for a thorough reassessment of the mechanics of financial development, which would have little to do with revolutions in constitutions or commitments. This is contrary to the hypothesis put forward by neo-institutional economic historians. Their view, we think, is rooted in the modern notion of sovereign ceiling: Government bonds are essentially risk-free assets, enjoying the highest grade and trading at the highest price compared to corporate securities. If one believes in the sovereign ceiling argument, then one is naturally led to treat transformations fostering the credibility of the sovereign as critical. They are bound to have trickle down effects on economic development, with the improvement in the quality of the sovereign percolating the economy at large through the reduction of all interest rates that must follow the reduction in government rates. The political transformations that took place in 1688 and after would then be epoch making, since they had the potential to lead to a considerable increase in the credibility of the British government. This familiar narrative places much emphasis on national differences, government quality, and interstate competition.
The alternative that emerges from our discussion is the following. Long before the British government reformed itself to take advantage of the possibilities of the capital market, a deep transformation of this capital market had already taken place. Commercial interest rates were very low quite early, but better still, they were so for merchants all over Europe. In effect, the low interest rates at which the British government managed to secure capital during the eighteenth century, after its reorganization of 1688, were identical to the cost at which Amsterdam or Paris merchant bankers lent money to their London counterparts.
If one were to exaggerate a little bit (but only a little bit), one would argue that there is nothing exciting about the British government catching up on the credit of bankers. That the Glorious Revolution forced the introduction of a heavy dose of business like manners in government is consistent with our insight that, in the late seventeenth century, "benchmark" rates were provided by commercial credit so that there was no sovereign ceiling. Corporate governance was the basis of credit, and government had to adjust to it.
To state things as clearly as possible, we are arguing here that, in the early modern period, there was no sovereign ceiling but instead a corporate one. The history of finance in the eighteenth century and afterwards would be that of the delayed catch-up by governments on commercial best practice. Or, to put it in still another way, it is a story of how governments reformed themselves to become included in a "bell jar" that pre-dated their subjecting to parliamentary control. This way of looking at things advises against writing about early modern financial development from a narrowly national perspective, since the transformation that occurred in finance long before 1688 was international or more rigorously, European. In any case, it was closely related to the making and reinforcement of a global community of merchants that was transnational by logic, multicultural by nature, and diffuse by necessity. In this context, the key questions would be to understand why and how --despite inept governments that went bankrupt, relished predation, or imposed all kinds of counterproductive regulations --finance found ways to develop, prosper, and integrate internationally long before the late eighteenth century. We are aware that this perspective is quite new and encourage future research along those lines.
We also emphasize, however, that our claim that financial development was in essence an international phenomenon does not mean that financial geography was a tabula rasa --a flat table. This was our second main theme. While we found that interest rates did not differ much between the markets under study (Amsterdam, London, and Paris), we also noted that there were persistent differences in average rates, suggesting different degrees of liquidity. Similarly, we reported that, quite early in the century, London --the capital of what was by then the world's leading commercial power --tended to register the lowest commercial interest rates available anywhere. We also found evidence that some financial routes may have been one-way streets: The peculiar behavior of Paris shadow interest rates inferred from the Amsterdam course of exchange suggests a limited use of Paris credit by Amsterdam bankers, but by contrast there is anecdotal evidence of Paris bankers relying on Amsterdam. The conclusion, therefore, is that within global finance there were capitals, hubs, highways, secondary routes, and a direction of circulation.
Finally, at the intersection of these two issues --the high degree of international financial sophistication within the community of merchant bankers prevailing already in the early eighteenth century, and the chasm that existed between this community and a large variety of economic agents (both public and private) who lived outside the bell jar in abject underdevelopment --lies the key problem facing eighteenth century thinkers of policy making. For them, much as for Hernando de Soto today, the question was not how to develop finance, since finance had already developed, but rather how to develop the rest of the economy to match the levels achieved within the global financial system.
Contemporaries thus struggled with the question of how to break open the jar of European financial capitalism so that it would pour its riches over the rest of the economy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they were naturally led to look for lessons in the way merchant bankers had dealt with development, in so doing, put the final stone on a construction that had been started much earlier and whose completion may have indeed opened the way for the subsequent material revolution. As Condillac concluded a key chapter of Le commerce et le gouvernement: "Si l'art de mettre en valeur les terres avoit fait les mêmes progrès que l'art de mettre l'argent en valeur, nos laboureurs ne seroient pas aussi misérables qu'ils le sont." Hatton (1727 Hatton ( , 1734 Hatton ( , 1754 Hatton ( , 1766 Hatton ( , 1794 do not update the data -except for Britain's data (which was probably adjusted for change in regulations; see text). Notes: (a) "Turkey" refers to either "Ottoman Empire" or so-called "Mahometan nations" Table A .2 reports the results from simple regressions of the shadow Paris interest rate (computed from the London course of exchange) on the actual Paris interest rate (franc) and the London interest rate (sterling). As the table shows, there is a modest influence of local money market conditions on shadow interest rates, but the predominant driver is the actual interest rate. In the late nineteenth century world of small transaction costs, the limited extent of the local money effect is understandable. We can surmise that this factor was more substantial for earlier periods. 
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Appendix 2. Incidence on Local Rates on Shadow Foreign Interest Rates: Nineteenth Century Evidence
